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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
FAPSI and FSB deny confrontation 
The leader of the Federal Agency of Government Communication and 
Information, General Aleksandr Starovoitov, and Federal Security Service's chief 
Nikolai Kovalev issued an unusual joint statement on April 7, denying media 
reports of conflict between the agencies. The affirmation of unity by these 
services was apparently prompted by recent press allegations stemming from the 
incarceration of General Valeri Monastyretsky. Monastyretsky, the former chief of 
the Financial and Economic Directorate of FAPSI, was arrested last year on 
charges of bribery and embezzlement. 
 
Charges were leveled against Monastyretsky after his departure from FAPSI and 
appear to be connected to his work for a private firm with close connections to 
the Information Agency. Press reports shortly after the general's arrest noted 
Monastyretsky's unwillingness to cooperate with FSB staff and his demands for 
the involvement of the Prosecutor's Office. The arrest of Monastyretsky has been 
seen as part of an effort by the FSB to assert control over FAPSI, as it had been 
controlled by the KGB until the end of 1991. (Izvestiya, 23 May 96; Moscow 
News, 15 Aug 96) 
 
The Monastyretsky case resurfaced in the news when FSB Colonel Mikhail 
Astakhov discussed details of the charges in an interview with Nezavisimaya 
gazeta (29 March 97). Astakhov, head of the Military Counterintelligence 
Department, has since been relieved of his duties for divulging information about 
the case. On April 7, the charges against Monastyretsky were re-formulated by 
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the prosecutor apparently in accordance with the new Criminal Code adopted in 
January. On April 9, a senior investigator in the prosecutor's office, Boris Uvarov, 
asked for an extension of Monastyretsky's detention to eighteen months (he has 
been in jail since April 12, 1996) in order to continue the investigation 
unimpeded. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Apr 97) 
 
Borodin's discretionary funds? 
Pavel Borodin, head of the President's Economic Management Administration, 
has been quite vocal in his opposition to the recent instruction that government 
officials trade in their foreign luxury cars for Volgas. As the key official 
responsible for procuring and disbursing political perks, he clearly has some 
experience in the relative value of the automobiles of the elite. It seems, 
however, that his purview expands beyond the selection of apartments and 
automobiles for Russia's politicians. Borodin recently toured an aircraft factory in 
Saratov, where he pledged ten million dollars for the completion of an airplane 
dubbed the "flying saucer." The flying saucer's design innovations include an 
aerodynamic wing system to give it extra lift, and an increase in payload capacity 
of up to 40 percent of its weight. The factory's director, Aleksandr Yermishin, 
claims the new plane will be particularly effective in carrying water for firefighting 
operations. (ITAR-TASS, 10 Apr 97) 
 
Box of money dropped, but campaign funds to be audited 
The Russian Prosecutor has decided to end the investigation into the $534,000 
taken out of the Kremlin and confiscated by the Main Guard Directorate on June 
19, 1996. The original charges leveled against the campaign staffers involved are 
no longer considered criminal according to Russia's new laws on foreign 
currency transactions. While several officials will certainly be relieved at the end 
of the criminal investigation, the issue of campaign funds may still spark new 
controversies. The president's Audit Chamber, headed now by Vladimir Putin, is 
planning to review the use of federal budget and non-budget funds for the 1996 
presidential elections. Included in the Audit Chamber's review will be the 
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"reliability of accounting and the degree of payment for all mass events related to 
political advertising of candidates, the 'Vote or Lose' project in particular." 
(Interfax, 9 Apr 97) 
 
RF SECURITY ORGANS 
MVD, FSB stress legal reform in fight against corruption  
MVD Chief Anatoli Kulikov criticized the April 8 Presidential decree on anti-
corruption tasks as "only partly cover[ing] matters related to corruption." A new 
document, to be drafted withe the cooperation of the Prosecutor's Office and 
other law enforcement agencies, is currently under consideration. Among the 
most crucial elements of tax reform and collection, Kulikov cited the adoption of a 
new tax code, which is to be submitted to the Duma later this year. Among the 
new initiatives for collecting taxes, Kulikov recommends the "issue of tax 
passports to companies." (Interfax, 9 Apr 97) 
 
FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev has also cited the need for new legislation to 
support the anti-corruption efforts: "There is a need to adopt a number of 
principled laws and primarily a law on corruption." Among the initiatives Kovalev 
envisages is a measure to grant financial authorities the right to set up conditions 
for testing an official's integrity, such as offering a bribe—a practice which often 
leads to charges of entrapment in this country. Kovalev did insist, however, that 
such a right would be "only for financial organs and in no case for law 
enforcement agencies." (Interfax, 15 April 1997) 
 
RF DEFENSE COUNCIL 
Rodionov denounces Armenia arms sales, reveals constraint on dismissals 
In an interview with Moskovsky komsomolets, Defense Minister Igor Rodionov 
claimed that he had seen no orders by the political leadership on the transfer of 
arms to Armenia. According to Rodionov, the sales were initiated by the military, 
demonstrating "that the leaders of various command directorates formed a single 
cartel." Rodionov was slightly more circumspect as to whether or not the political 
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leadership was aware of the sales: "The impression is that the state leadership 
was not fully briefed on the actual situation. And the generals took advantage of 
the great trust that was vested in them." (Moskovsky komsomolets, 12 Apr 97) 
 
On the subject of the dismissal of General Semenov and other leading military 
officials, Rodionov claimed that during discussions with the president, Yel'tsin 
had agreed to the dismissals "but nothing has been done." In the case of former 
Chief Military Finance Manager Vorobyev, Rodionov claims he was "suspended 
by a presidential edict nearly two years ago but has not been discharged. 
Eighteen members of the Higher Certification Commission voted for his 
resignation. Only Yuri Mikhailovich Baturin was against. Because Baturin handles 
all documents, it seems his opinion outweighs that of all others." (Moskovsky 
komsomolets, 12 Apr 97) A recent presidential decree has finalized the dismissal 
of Semenov and three other high-ranking military officials. (Interfax, 11 Apr 97) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Likely future Iranian president wraps up visit to Russia 
'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, speaker of the Iranian Majles (parliament) and leading 
contender in upcoming presidential elections, enjoyed a warm reception from the 
Russian Duma and Russian president Boris Yel'tsin during a three-day visit from 
11 to 14 April. 
 
Nateq-Nuri returned the hospitality by echoing many of Russia's complaints 
about NATO expansion and calling for cooperation among China, Iran and 
Russia to establish a regional "axis." He also warned that Russia and Iran must 
cooperate to thwart exploitation of oil in the Caspian "lake." "The situation is 
extremely dangerous," Nateq-Nuri told deputies of the Russian Duma, "and can 
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result in irreparable ecological damage, as well as encroachment by foreign 
plunderers." (Moscow Voice of Russia World Service, 11 Apr 97) 
 
Nateq-Nuri and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov also hinted that the 
two nations might collude to bring to Afghanistan the "peace" that had prevailed 
in Tajikistan thanks to their joint efforts. (IRNA, 11 Apr 97) 
 
Primakov nobbles French foreign minister over dinner in Paris… 
Fears that Russia might yet find a way to water down the upcoming expansion of 
NATO were not allayed by the friendly dinner Primakov enjoyed with French 
foreign minister Herve de Charette in Paris on April 9. 
 
"Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov has been a friend for two years now," Charette 
said as the two sat down to the restaurant table. "We meet every month or every 
two months and, whenever possible, we have dinner together in a friendly way." 
 
Primakov said he supported French designs for a more "Europeanized" NATO 
that pursued a peacekeeping role. "If the French general is installed in Naples at 
the head of the southern command…" Primakov said before pausing. "Far be it 
from us to interfere in NATO's internal affairs," he continued, "but, in any case, I 
will greet him with the greatest pleasure." (LCI Television, 9 Apr 97) 
 
There were no reports as to which minister picked up the tab this time out. But a 
Belgian commentator noted that French President Jacques Chirac owed the 
Russians a great favor for agreeing to sign their agreement with NATO in Paris in 
May. "It would symbolize this rebalancing which is taking place in the NATO 
arena between Russia, Western Europe and the United States," Pierre Lefevre 
noted, "and provide evidence of a certain very Gaullist complicity between Russia 
and France or Russia and Europe." (Le Soir, 14 Apr 97) 
 
. . . while Zyuganov thunders about Western threat to Russia 
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Apparently weary from moderating his tone on his January tour of the United 
States, National Patriotic Front leader Gennadi Zyuganov blasted the current 
Russian leadership for having "sufficient will only to starve the country for the 
sake of their personal, selfish interests and in response to the diktat of the 
International Monetary Fund." 
 
"We should have no illusions," Zyuganov wrote in Sovetskaya Rossiya on April 
10. "The West sees Russia as its most dangerous opponent. An opponent who 
has been weakened, bloodied, and bowed, but not beaten once and for all and 
who is capable of recovery." 
 
Zyuganov alleged that the collapse of the USSR had been preceded by a 
meeting of the Bilderberg Club at which "David Rockefeller, a very powerful 
American banker and head of the highly influential Trilateral Commission" 
purportedly called for the establishment of a "single world government." "A 
supranational government of the intellectual elite and world bankers," Zyuganov 
reported that Rockefeller said, "is preferable to the right of peoples to self-
determination." (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 10 Apr 97) 
 
Chinese president to visit Moscow 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin will visit Russia from April 22 to 26 at the 
invitation of Russian President Boris Yel'tsin. 
 
In a Russian state broadcast to the Chinese in Mandarin, a Russian foreign 
ministry spokesman said that both Russia and China "hold that this is a transition 
period when the world is moving from a bipolar to a multipolar configuration, that 
is, no country should expect to be given exceptional treatment. Russia and China 
will become two important and independent poles in the multipolar world." (Voice 
of Russia World Service, 7 Apr 97) 
 
Comment 
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Axis to Grind 
It was no doubt unintentional, but Iranian president-to-be 'Ali Akbar NateqNuri 
was helpful when he described his envisioned alliance of China, Russia and Iran 
as a regional "axis." As Walter Laqueur recently argued in Fascism: Past, 
Present, Future, Islamic fundamentalism more than any other contemporary 
phenomenon resembles German National Socialism in its loathing of liberal 
democracy. If the three should work together to promote the kind of "peace" that 
Tajikstan now suffers from, the Central Asian states will have great cause to 
worry. 
 
One might hope that contemporary Russia shares with Iran only the political 
lexicon of opportunism. In this dictionary, the Caspian is not a "sea," which would 
require international negotiations with the Central Asian and Caucasian states on 
its shores, but rather a "lake" whose development (see "exploitation") needs 
region-wide agreement before Western companies (see "plunderers") can begin 
production. 
 
Gennadi Zyuganov's recent anti-Western tirade might give the Western observer 
reason to fear that a vast section of the Russian elite shares a great deal more 
with the Iranian mind than one would hope. Zyuganov is, after all, leader of the 
Russian Duma's largest single parliamentary bloc. Should such paranoids at long 
last seize the Kremlin, the foreign policy coming out of the Kremlin today would 
seem to speak to the foresight of its creator. For the definition of this kind of long-
range and self-serving opportunism, see "Primakov." Just don't let him buy you 
dinner. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
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Newly elected LDPR governor of Pskov Oblast interviewed 
Yevgeniy Mikhaylov, State Duma deputy from the LDPR (Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia), won the elections for governor of Pskov Oblast. He is the only 
Zhirinovskiy-ite in Russia to hold a governor's seat. With regards to relations with 
Latvia, Mikhaylov says that they should, "make their claims… It seems to me that 
they themselves do not believe that someone will hand something over to them. 
However, no one will object to foreign investment in the oblast. Mikhaylov is also 
the author of the little known tract, "The Burden of an Imperial Nation." He also 
formed his cabinet—and his contingent of bodyguards—almost exclusively from 
the ranks of the LDPR. These elections results do not bode well for 
Russian/Latvian relations. (Obshchaya gazeta, 6 Mar 97) 
 
Gubernatorial election results analyzed 
The gubernatorial elections are not yet over. Still ahead are important elections in 
Kemerovo, Tula, and Tver Oblasts. However, governors won mainly where a few 
months ago Yel'tsin beat G. Zyuganov, and lost, as a rule, where Yel'tsin also 
lost. Incumbent governors kept their seats in 23 regions, in 18 of which B. Yel'tsin 
overcame G. Zyuganov in the presidential elections, and lost in 24 regions, of 
which in 11 G. Zyuganov came out ahead of B. Yel'tsin. In other words, of the 47 
federation components where elections of administration heads took place, B. 
Yel'tsin lost in 16 and won in 31—a ratio close to the national average. 
 
Also mysterious is the de-ideologization of the campaigns. Most of observers 
expected the gubernatorial elections to become a decisive new battlefield 
between the left and the demo-centrists. Although Zyuganov predicted 
ideological warfare, questions of an ideological nature were not discussed at all. 
(Rossiyskiye vesti, 6 Mar 97) 
 
Duma passes law on opposition political activity 
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The bill, proposed by a communist deputy and now subject to approval by the 
Federation Council, defines opposition activity as any activity, at both national 
and regional levels, opposed to the policy of the president and government. The 
law, if enacted, would allow opposition activity both within and outside legislative 
bodies. It would prohibit the prosecution of any political groups, any of their 
members or any unaffiliated individuals for voicing ideas or views opposed to the 
government policy. However, it would ban what the bill terms as activity aimed at 
fanning social, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or hostility and appeals for 
physical violence. It would permit suspension of opposition groups by court order. 
 
The proposed law would allow any group which won a minimum of 20% of votes 
at the latest parliamentary election to form a shadow cabinet. The bill was 
passed by a vote of 266 to 48, with one abstention. The purpose of this law is 
unclear—unless one assumes that the communists fear that their oppositional 
status may become permanent. The Russian constitution already provides for 
freedom of political thought, association, and political participation. (Interfax, 5 
Mar 97) 
 
CPRF congress seeks party centralization 
The tenth plenary session of the CPRF was held at the Parliamentary Center on 
3 March 1997. For the first time, the communists made no secret of the venue, 
even inviting journalists to listen. Despite the fact that the "rejuvenation of 
secretaries" is in full swing and they are no longer engaged in "self-destructive 
practices," there is "mutual suspiciousness and distrust on the part of hysterical 
elements within the party…" 
 
The gist of the proposals concerning the reform of the rules was to centralize "the 
leading and guiding force" (the CPRF) and to create within the Central 
Committee a "strategic agency" to formulate party policy, and an executive 
agency (the secretariat to be headed by a "general secretary" chosen from 
among the party leaders). 
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While the terminology harks back to earlier times, a highly centralized party 
structure in an increasingly decentralized political environment suggests that a 
return to the past is not likely. As recently evidenced by regional elections, local 
issues were most important and it is unlikely that party centralization will or can 
help. In fact, attempts to strengthen party solidarity will inevitably lead to schism. 
A better approach would be to instill flexability into the party structure—
something communist parties have never understood. (Moskovskiy 
komsomolets, 4 Mar 97) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Cathy Dreher and CDR John G. Steele 
 
NATO Expansion 
Beginning with the Helsinki Summit and over the past several weeks it seems 
Russia has basically acquiesced to the expansion of NATO in the context of 
eastern Europe, but Russia still strongly opposes the incorporation of any former 
members of the Soviet Union, and questions concerning the building of "military 
infrastructure" on the territory of any new NATO states remain (OMRI Daily 
Digest, 24 Mar 97). 
 
Comment 
Repeated stories have surfaced that Yel'tsin will sign a Russia-NATO Charter in 
late May. Among the many outstanding questions are the future status of the 
Baltics and other former members of the Soviet Union—that is, what has the 
West given up long term to gain this limited and ambiguous Russian 
acceptance? 
 
Russian Military Woes 
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A paratroop brigade in Stavropol Krai reportedly refused to take part in 
maneuvers until its wage arrears were paid (OMRI Daily Digest I, 24 Mar 97). 
Paratroop units have historically been viewed (by themselves and others) as elite 
units. The report, if accurate, does not encourage confidence in the discipline or 
morale of Russian conventional forces. 
 
Despite continued severe financial difficulties in the Russian military, construction 
continued on nuclear-survivable underground facilities in the Urals. (Reuters, 1 
Apr 97). How could such construction possibly be justified in the context of the 
present political situation, or the Russian fiscal environment? Either they are not 
acting rationally, or their world view is radically different from the Russian attitude 
that is being portrayed in the Western media. 
 
Amnesty International recently reported that in the Russian military, "torture, and 
ill-treatment of soldiers through starvation, rape, and beatings are widespread. 
The military is characterized as a "gulag-style" institution where 3,000 troops died 
of suicide or "criminal incidents" in 1994. (Monitor, 4 Apr 97). 
 
Comment  
Such reports are consistent and commonplace—in the case of the conventional 
forces. These reports are not usually seen in relation to Strategic Forces, nor 
border troops, nor troops of the Interior Ministry The implications are obvious as 
to the clear priorities of the Russian authorities. 
 
Arms Control 
At the Helsinki Summit Presidents Clinton and Yel'tsin issued joint statements on 
arms reductions, anti-missile defenses and the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Movement toward START-III was indicated. (Monitor, 24 Mar 97) 
 
International incidents 
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Russia continues to chase Turkish trawlers in Georgian Black Sea waters. 
(Monitor, 26 Mar 97). These continued actions supposedly demonstrate: (1) 
Georgia's inability to police her own borders; (2) the need for continued de facto 
Russian control of those borders; and (3) the continued foreign "threat" to those 
borders. Malign Russian complicity in the various Caucasian conflicts has been a 
persistent rumor for sometime. Given the recent events in Abkazia, South 
Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, it's hard to see how another conclusion could 
reasonably be drawn. 
 
CIS Relations 
The Russian Duma ratified a 25-year military base treaty for Armenia, which will, 
when ratified by the Armenian parliament, "commit the country to satellite status 
for the life span of the next generation." (Monitor, 21 Apr 97) In addition, "illegal" 
Russian arms shipments to Armenia have been all but confirmed. (Monitor, 25 
Mar 97). This revelation calls into question Russia's role as "peacekeeper" (not to 
mention her neutrality) in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While much 
noise has been made concerning the prosecution of those responsible, the 
prospects of any meaningful investigations are, given Russia's record in cases of 
this kind, virtually nonexistent. 
 
Large-scale firings of senior officers occur 
The Armed Forces continue to disintegrate and be adrift with lack of pay, 
inadequate housing, food shortages and no real end in sight. Promises of 
resolution abound with little hope of success. What is occurring that is interesting 
is the large-scale firing of senior military officials (Interfax, 18 Mar 97). Two 
reasons may explain these firings: Yel'tsin is trying, without success, to find 
someone to fix the problem, or significant graft and corruption exist in the top 
positions in the military. "This applies to several generals who are not on par with 
their expected duties or who, instead of carrying out their duties, are involved in 
activities incompatible with their position." Once identified they are being 
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removed. None of these actions does much to resolve the military issue but there 
is a perception that Yel'tsin is trying. 
 
Military exercises planned, despite budget shortages 
Despite numerous shortages in the military, several military exercises are 
scheduled for the next few months. In the US when funding shortages occur one 
of the first cuts taken is exercises. They are often reduced in scope or canceled 
altogether. Given the funding shortages in Russia, participation in new exercises 
is cause for speculation. They are largely US or NATO Partnership for Peace 
exercises: Sea Breeze 97(Interfax, 7 Mar 97), Centrasbat 97 (Interfax, 11 Mar 
97). It is likely that Russia needs to have her military viewed as capable. On the 
homefront, exercises along her troubled borders could be a scare tactic for 
troubled areas to cease and desist. (ITAR-TASS, 14 Mar 97; Radio Rossii 
Network, 20 Mar 97; and ITAR-TASS, 21 Mar 97) 
 
Threat from atomic secrets disclosure apparent 
Russia is carrying out large-scale conversion of its nuclear industry and retraining 
of its personnel. (Moscow Sovetskaya, 1 Mar 97). "The following figures illustrate 
the size of its task: The Russian Federation has 34,000 nuclear and radiation 
hazardous facilities, 29 nuclear power units, 113 scientific research reactors and 
critical and subcritical assemblies containing nuclear materials, 21 enterprises 
involved in the fuel-power cycle, 245 nuclear submarines, of which 120 have 
been decommissioned, containing 170 nuclear reactors with undischarged fuel, 
12 nuclear surface vessels, thousands of tonnes of spent nuclear fuel, and 3 
billion curies of temporarily buried radioactive waste. All this is in various 
departments, where conditions are difficult because of conversion." This is a 
significant amount of nuclear material. There is good reason for public concern 
about careless storage and use of nuclear materials, and over theft, illegal trade 
and mis-use of nuclear materials. Future meetings of the summit of 8 will include 
requests for aid in handling nuclear waste. These leaks of formerly secret data 
may be an attempt to pave the way for monetary aid requests. 
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Nuclear testing victims appeal for help 
A long standing problem in Russia has been its handling of nuclear materials. 
Throughout the Cold War era, there were incidents involving nuclear tests, 
nuclear waste handling, and nuclear reactors. Recent message traffic indicates 
that there is concern in Russia for persons who were victims of nuclear testing. It 
appears that these incidents will now be investigated and necessary treatment 
provided for victims. 
 
Accidental nuclear strike possible 
Col Robert Bykov, former Strategic Missile Force member and current assistant 
to a Duma deputy, stated that in his experience Igor Rodionov's alarming 
statements on the "reduced reliability and stability of the strategic nuclear forces' 
command and control system" were absolutely correct. He said this in contrast to 
the press' earlier disparaging label of "hysterical." Bykov went so far as to say 
"we could launch an accidental nuclear strike on the United States in the matter 
of seconds it takes you to read these lines." His intent is to focus on the ongoing 
pay problems in the forces, indicating that "the patience of these officers is not 
infinite and that there is no guarantee of psychological stability in today's forces. 
(Komsomolskaya pravda, 15 Mar 97). 
 
Complaints from Kazakstan have surfaced over Russia's establishment of border 
posts between the two countries manned by irregular Cossack units—and refusal 
to establish border markers. (Monitor, 27 Mar 97) Cossack units (famed for their 
ferocity) were one of the principal means of Tsarist establishment and 
maintenance of the empire, particularly in the south. The reemergence of these 
units, with official Russian sanction, cannot but be seen as threatening by the 
Central Asian and Caucasian republics. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Chechnya 
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By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
International flights from Grozny airport 
In order to facilitate the hadj, the pilgrimage to the Moslem holy places in Mecca 
and Medina, charter flights between Grozny's Severnyy airport and Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia were organized. (ITAR-TASS, 4 Apr 97) All border and customs 
procedures were conducted at Severnyy and a team of Russian customs officials 
was readied to take charge of the process. (ITAR-TASS, 5 Apr 97) Since airlines 
and international airports are an important attribute of sovereignty, Yel'tsin's 
representative to the talks with Chechnya, Ivan Rybkin, tried to characterize the 
flights as a Russian goodwill gesture and an exceptional occurrence. 
 
Border issues 
President Aslan Maskhadov met with Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko 
Nadibaidze and Ingush President Rulsan Ayushev on 6 April to discuss the 
border arrangements among them. Russian border service patrols the Georgian 
side of the Chechen-Georgian border and the Russian side has recently 
proposed to set up additional border posts there. (Novoye vremya, 6 Apr 97) 
Georgia's border protection arrangement is of particular importance to the 
Chechen side since the rest of Chechnya borders Russian territory. 
 
One Chechen and one Ingush policeman were killed during a shootout on the 
border between Ingushetia and Chechnya on 6 April. A Duma deputy, Mikhail 
Gutseriyev, seized on the event to urge greater federal involvement in guarding 
the border. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Apr 97) To ensure that in the future such border 
incidents would not be perceived as aggressive Chechen actions, President 
Maskhadov prohibited members of Chechnya's militia to carry firearms or wear 
uniforms when visiting neighboring regions. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Apr 97) 
 
A more serious confrontation seemed imminent but was averted in Dagestan 
when local Chechen and Kumyk residents took over the building of the local 
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administration in Khasavyurt. They were angered by the appointment of an Avar 
as head of the local administration. In response 300 Avars declared their 
readiness to move against the Chechen and Kumyks. The Chechen Vice 
President, Vakha Arsanov, urged the Dagestan police to solve the matter without 
violence and declared his readiness to send formations from Chechnya to 
Khasavyurt if the local Chechens were fired upon. (Ekho moskvy, 9 Apr 97) 
Dagestan police, guarding the border with Chechnya, were instructed to shoot at 
armed groups coming from Chechnya. (NTV, 10 Apr 97) 
 
On 12 April MVD and Ministry of Defense units held exercises in Stavropol Kray 
to coordinate the activities of the various police, military, reserve and Cossack 
forces in the event of armed formations entering Stavropol from Chechnya. Three 
days later TASS reported that the law enforcement agencies of Stavropol were 
considering digging a deep trench along the entire (114 kilometer) border with 
Chechnya to ward off would-be terrorists or cattle thieves. 
 
In reference to these events, the Security Council Deputy Secretary, Leonid 
Mayorov, announced that an April meeting of the Security Council will take up the 
entire spectrum of political and military arrangements in the North Caucasus, 
including the issue of strengthening the border between Stavropol and 
Chechnya. 
 
Comment 
In recent weeks the Chechen authorities have formally apologized to the 
Georgian government for the aid they had given to the Abkhaz, which opens the 
way for renewed cooperation between the two countries. The Georgians, who 
have been protesting the presence of Russian border guards on their borders, 
and the Chechens, who would also like to see the end of the Russian patrols, 
may now be able to coordinate their efforts to rid the Georgian-Chechen border 
of the Russian military presence there. 
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The border protection issue is a sensitive one for the Russian authorities who 
wish to emphasize that the borders are administrative and internal only. 
However, given the initiatives to bolster security and create new militarized 
checkpoints along these borders, the distinction between international and 
internal borders becomes one of little relevance to the situation on the ground. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Alexandra S. Y. Kim 
 
Belarus Charter is a disappointment 
Although Belarusian President Lukashenka would not publically admit he is 
disappointed with the Russian-Belarus unification treaty, or the charter, he stated 
that what is important is not "insisting on a discussion of the union charter." 
(Interfax, 8 Apr 97) As expected, the much-needed establishment of a single 
currency for Belarus will not go into effect for another two or three years. (ITAR-
TASS, 9 Apr 97) However, he continued to capture the media's attention with his 
international conference on "Prospects for the Creation of a Space Free from 
Nuclear Weapons in Central and Eastern Europe" on 8-9 April. (Belapan, 16 Apr 
97) 
 
OSCE experts arrive to meet prime minister for human rights 
On 15 April Belarusian Prime Minister Linh received a delegation of OSCE 
experts on human rights problems. During the peaceful demonstration protesting 
the Russian-Belarusian union, human rights were violated by the Belarusian 
police on 2 April. About 200 people were detained and as many as 60 people 
were hurt; with recent bans of media coverage of such demonstrations, OSCE 
experts, as well as Helsinki Rights Groups, are worried about the situation in 
Belarus. Rudolf Thorning-Petersen, the acting chairman's envoy, is not leading 
the first set of experts to visit Belarus. The first visitors were supposedly given 
freedom to ask anyone for information, but were forbidden to do so later. This 
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time, Interfax reports, Thorning-Petersen is "ready to broaden contacts with 
Belarus in all spheres." (Interfax, 17 Apr 97) 
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